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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper I reexamine the status exchange hypothesis (Davis 1941; Merton 
1941), which argued that minorities exchange their high socioeconomic status for the 
"high" social status of whites. Specifically, I reanalyze the cross-classification table 
presented in Fu (2001) on recent marriages among whites, blacks, Mexicans, and 
Japanese (from the 1990 PUMS data), which claims to corroborate the status exchange 
hypothesis for intermarriage between whites and blacks as well as between whites and 
Mexican Americans. Using a simple quasi-symmetry model, I show that the same-race 
and mixed-race marriage share a broadly similar pattern of educational homogamy, 
which is quasi-symmetric in character. Thus, I argue that this suggests little, if any, 
evidence for the status exchange hypothesis. Furthermore, the evidence strongly 
indicates that there is a remarkable consistency and symmetry in husband/wife 
educational attainment regardless of race (with the possible exception of white/white 
marriages); intermarried couples share a similar level of education, and educational 
homogamy dominates the educational marriages, no matter how strong the racial 
endogamy is. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“…the reciprocal racial attraction and repulsion, might be measured by finding 
whether sexual relations are preferred or rare between two groups, and whether they 
are carried on permanently or temporarily and irregularly.  In all groups with 
developed “ethnic” consciousness the existence or absence of intermarriage 
(connubium) would then be a normal consequence of racial attraction or 
segregation.”  
 -Max Weber, Economy and Society (V,i). 
 
Since Weber’s famous insight in Economy and Society that looking at the 
causes and consequences of interracial marriage can shed insight into race relations 
generally; a stream of scholars from many different traditions of sociology have 
argued for the theoretical importance in understanding interracial marriage. Robert 
Merton and Kingsley Davis claimed that examining interracial marriage can uncover 
insights on the relationship between the social structure and intergroup relations 
(Merton 1941; Davis 1941). Later scholars have suggested it to be both a major cause 
and an important indicator of social and cultural integration, having an important 
bearing on the structural elements of society such as social distance and societal 
processes such as assimilation (Alba and Golden 1986; Alba and Nee 2003; Alba and 
Nee 1997; Fu 2001; Gordon 1964; Kalmijn 1998; Lieberson, Waters et al. 1988; Park 
1950). 
Since the anti-miscegenation laws were overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in mid-1960s, interracial marriage rates in the United States have increased rapidly. 
For example, the rate of interracial marriage has increased from 1.31% in 1980 to 
1.81% in 1990 and 2.89% in 2002 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003). Although 2 
 
mixed-race marriage rates are still relatively low (compared to same-race marriage 
rates), they continue to grow rapidly, having more than doubled in the last 20 years.  
With a continued theoretical interest in intermarriage by numerous scholars 
and the actual growth of the phenomenon in scope, a set of perspectives and 
corresponding debates in accounting for it proliferated. The recent advances in 
statistical methodology added more vigor to those debates. 
In this paper, I will try to accomplish three goals. Fist, I will introduce the 
theoretical perspectives that have been advanced to account for intermarriage: 
assimilationist, structuralist, and exchange perspectives. Second, I will focus on a 
particular perspective, the exchange perspective and the empirical controversy
1 that it 
has aroused. While I will introduce the long debate between critics and supporters, I 
will once again focus on a particular recent disagreement, between Fu (2001) and 
Rosenfeld (2005). Third, I will critique the claims that each side makes in interpreting 
the data to support or oppose the exchange hypothesis respectively. While I will side 
with Rosenfeld in the conclusion that the exchange hypothesis is under-supported by 
the evidence, I will propose a new model that better fits the data.  
 
                                                 
1 I make a distinction between a theoretical controversy which involves disagreement over the logical 
structure of the theory and an empirical controversy which involves disagreement over the extent to 
which data does or does not support a given theory.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORY CONTEXT 
 
Traditionally there are three perspectives that explain intermarriage: 
assimilationist, structuralist, and status exchange. While I will briefly discuss the first 
two perspectives to provide some context, the focus of this paper will be on the third.  
The Assimilationist Perspective 
The main proponent of the assimilationist perspective is Milton Gordon 
(1964). Its basic argument is that intermarriage is the “keystone of the arch of 
assimilation” and the indicator of social distance between groups. According to 
Gordon’s (1964) seven-stage model, assimilation starts with (1) acculturation (cultural 
or behavioral assimilation), proceeds to (2) structural assimilation, which is “large 
scale entrance into cliques, clubs, and institutions of the host society in a primary 
group”, and follows with (3) marital assimilation. When large-scale intermarriage 
takes place, the minority group melts into the host society which results in (4) 
“identificational assimilation”. The others states (5) “absence of prejudice”, (6) 
“discrimination”, and (7) “value and power conflict” follow naturally. Gordon claims 
that compared to those who do not intermarry, those who do, generally possess greater 
social, political, and economic characteristics that resemble those of the host society. 
This assimilationist view of inter-relationships has been shared by many students of 
racial and ethnic relations (Massey 1981; Massey and Mullan 1984; Lieberson, Waters 
et al. 1988; Alba and Nee 1997; Rosenfeld 2002; Alba and Nee 2003). 4 
 
The Structuralist Perspective  
The main proponent of the structuralist perspective is Peter Blau (1977; Blau, 
Blum et al. 1982; Blau, Beeker et al. 1984; Rytina, Blau et al. 1988). Its basic 
argument is that a person’s decision in selecting a mate is severely constrained by the 
social structure, despite his/her cultural attitudes. A structuralist account would, for 
example, examine how the availability of potential marriage partners in the population 
affects a person’s marital choice. Blau (1977, 1982) claims that the opportunities of 
intergroup contact are higher in a heterogeneous and residentially integrated 
community than in a homogeneous and highly segregated one. He further argues that 
intermarriage is not only affected by group-specific attributes such as group size or sex 
ratio, but also by the amount of spatial and social proximity between groups (e.g. 
socioeconomic inequality). For Blau the assorting of partners depends not only on 
preferences but also the opportunities available to partners to marry one other (i.e., 
while people make marital decisions according to their cultural preferences, their 
decisions are, nevertheless, constrained by structural reality) (Blau, 1977). The 
usefulness of a structuralist view in intermarriage has been widely recognized, 
especially for conducting empirical research (Gurak and Fitzpatrick 1982; Fitzpatrick 
and Hwang 1992; Anderson and Saenz 1994; Hwang, Saenz et al. 1994; Hwang, 
Saenz et al. 1997).  
 
The Status Exchange Perspective 
The main proponents of the status exchange perspective are Kingsley Davis 
(1941) and Robert Merton (1941). Its basic argument is that even under the 
circumstances of rigid intergroup boundaries and despite strong preferences to marry 
within their own group, blacks with high socioeconomic status might sometimes 
marry whites with low socioeconomic status. According to Merton, marriages between 5 
 
high status blacks and lower status whites represent an informal exchange, i.e., blacks 
exchange their higher achieved socioeconomic status for whites’ higher ascribed 
social status and this exchange pattern is stronger for black husband & white wife 
pairs than for other interracial pairs. 
While there has been relatively little controversy around the first two 
perspectives, status exchange has aroused much lively debate among researchers of 
intermarriage and continues to stimulate research (Kalmijn 1998). While many 
findings reaffirmed the status exchange hypothesis (Fu 2001; Kalmijn 1993; Qian 
1997; Schoen and Wooldredge 1989;), many others have questioned its usefulness 
(Rosenfeld 2005; Heer 1974; Hwang et al. 1995; Liang and Ito, 1999; Heaton and 
Albrecht, 1996; Jacobs and Labov, 2002, Rosenfeld, 2005). The remainder of the 
paper is devoted to this debate over the merits of status exchange theory in accounting 
for intermarriage.  
6 
CHAPTER 3 
 
THE STATUS EXCHANGE PERSPECTIVE: THE EMPIRICAL CONTROVERSY 
 
Advocacy for Status Exchange 
Many findings corroborated the status exchange hypothesis. The harmonic 
mean analyses by Schoen & Wooldredge (1989) showed that with respect to 
education, white women marry up more often when marrying a black man than when 
marrying a white man; similarly, black men marry down more often when marrying a 
white woman than when marrying a black woman. Parallel conclusions were reached 
in the examination of the marriage choices of white men and black women; when 
marrying exogenously, white men marry down less often and black women marry up 
less often. These asymmetries in spouses' educational characteristics were assessed 
after adjusting for the marginal distributions of education of race-sex groups and 
thereby support the hypothesis that majority men and women marry a minority spouse 
in part under the condition of socioeconomic status gains.  
Furthermore, Kalmijn (1993) proposed a hypergamy ratio2 approach to test for 
status exchange in black-white intermarriage. He compared the observed hypergamy 
ratios within interracial marriages to the expected hypergamy ratios from log-linear 
models under quasi-symmetry in which the expected hypergamy ratios only arise from 
differences in marginal distributions and not from asymmetric selection. Analyzing the 
annual marriage license data for 33 states from 1968 to 1986, he found that the 
observed hypergamy ratio in black husband and white wife marriage was much larger 
                                                 
2 The hypergamy ratio is calculated as the number of women marrying up in terms of education to the 
number marrying down. 7 
 
than the expected ratio (1.252 compared to the expected .928) under the quasi-
symmetry model, indicating white women are more likely to marry up than would be 
expected under the model which assumes no difference, and that the observed ratio in 
white husband and black wife marriage was 0.910, compared to the expected value of 
1.289, indicating black women are more likely to marry down than would be expected.  
Similar results were found in Qian (1997). Examining interracial marriage in 
the 1980 and 1990 Census data, he found that the exchange hypothesis is consistent 
with the data on intermarriage among African Americans, Hispanic, and Asian 
Americans. Acknowledging the educational homogamy pattern in interracial marriage, 
he claimed that the odds of interracial marriage increase with the couple’s educational 
attainment, and that for interracial married couples with different educational 
attainments, minorities with high education levels tend to marry whites with low 
education levels.   
Additionally, Fu (2001) identified endogamous intermarriage, status exchange, 
and in-group preference perfective as the three underlying patterns for intermarriage. 
Moreover, he claimed to provide a better test of the status exchange hypothesis, 
arguing that his results support it especially well for intermarriage between whites and 
blacks as well as whites and Mexican Americans. But while his results are largely 
consistent with Kaimijn’s (1993) and Qian’s (1997) findings (based on the hypergamy 
ratio approach), he nevertheless, found that marriages between Japanese Americans 
and whites follow an endogamous intermarriage pattern.  
Criticism of Status Exchange 
Others have questioned the empirical support for exchange theory, particularly 
in regards to the generalization of status exchange theory to intermarriage of white and 8 
 
Asian Americans as well as white and Hispanics. Hwang et al (1995) showed that this 
exchange pattern does not hold for Asian American women. They applied multinomial 
logit models to a representative U.S. sample of married Asians and find that Asian 
women with lower educational attainment have a higher probability of outmarriage, 
while Asian men provide weak evidence of negative selectivity of SES and tend to 
marry persons with lower educational attainment than themselves. 
Liang and Ito (1999) investigated the intermarriage patterns of five Asian 
American groups (Chinese, Koreans, Indians, Japanese, and Filipinos) in the New 
York City area. Focusing in particular on gender, nativity, and education, they found 
little evidence for Merton's (1941) hypothesis. Instead, their research revealed that: (1) 
US-born Asians are much more likely to intermarry than foreign-born Asians; (2) 
Asian women are much more likely to intermarry than Asian men; and that (3) 
intermarried individuals share educational homogeneity.  
In a later paper, Qian and colleagues (1999) applied log-linear models to 
examine assortative mating patterns by race/ethnicity, educational attainment, and 
nativity status. They found no evidence that Asian Americans marry less-educated 
whites for an exchange of "higher" racial status.  
Furthermore, Jacobs and Labov (2002) analyzed the data from the 1990 US 
Census to examine the intermarriage among 16 ethnic groups. They argued that an 
exchange pattern does not hold for the majority of Asian white marriages nor for the 
four Hispanic groups, and concluded that the applicability of status exchange theory 
should perhaps be limited to intermarriage between blacks and whites.  
Yet, other scholars questioned the applicability of status exchange theory even 
to intermarriage between blacks and whites, finding that interracial marriage is 
predominantly homogamous with respect to education. Using simple tabular analyses 
Bernard (1964) found that interracial marriage as of 1960 tended to be educationally 9 
 
homogamous. Similarly, Heer (1974) claimed that most black-white marriages are 
educationally homogamous and that the racial-caste hypogamy has no empirical 
support until the availability of marriage partners by educational attainment has been 
controlled for. Gadberry and Dodder (1993) replicated Bernard’s work and found that 
educational similarity in black-white marriages continued from 1960 through 1980. 
Rosenfeld (2005) examined the contradictory literature on exchange 
hypothesis with regard to black-white intermarriages and claimed that status 
homogamy in interracial marriages has been mistaken for status change due to the 
black-white inequality
3. Additionally, he claimed that gender differences among 
young couples have been mistaken for racially specific patterns of exchange. In 
addition, he found that the empirical support for status exchange is not robust, and that 
the simple tabulation that questions status exchange contradicts the more sophisticated 
methods that support status exchange. Favoring simple tabular analyses, Rosenfeld has 
questioned the validity of exchange theory and the justification of its continued use.  
Addressing the Controversy 
The empirical controversy mainly comes from how researchers test the status 
exchange hypothesis. The new article by Rosenfeld (2005) has claimed that there is a 
contradiction in simple and complex analyses of intermarriage. He explained it via a 
robust standard errors argument and tries to reconcile it by using negative binomial 
analysis. I will argue that this apparent contradiction is not real. The contradictory 
results are really due to the insistence on interpreting models that are not consistent 
with the data. For example, Fu (2001) claimed that he has provided an improved test 
of the status exchange hypothesis. He found that the “endogamous intermarriage 
model + constrained exchange parameters” (his Model 2a and 2b) fits better for 
                                                 
3 See Figure 2 in Appendix B for an explanation of the intermarriage pattern. 10 
 
marriages between whites and blacks as well as between whites and Mexican 
Americans than the “endogamous intermarriage model” and the “endogamous 
intermarriage model + unconstrained exchange parameters”. Upon closer examination, 
one can see that the model which he claimed endorses the status exchange hypothesis, 
clearly shows a lack of fit (
2 L =215.7116 with df=9 for whites and blacks and 
2 L =95.9568 with df=9). In addition, the previous model (Model 2c) fits the data much 
better than Fu’s preferred “endogamous intermarriage model” (Model 1c) for 
marriages between Japanese Americans and whites. Although he has acknowledged 
the significant improvement in fit of Model 2c over Model 1c, he still claimed Model 
1c as the more appropriate model solely based on the BIC statistics (Bayesian 
Information Criterion, Raftery 1986) when there is another model available that fits 
the data excellently. On the contrary, loglinear models that are consistent with the data 
clearly suggest that status exchange is a myth.  
In addition, the BIC has some important drawbacks and is not a reliable 
method for model selection in this context (Weakliem 1999; Weakliem 2004). 
According to Weakliem, 1) the BIC assumes a unit information prior and 
approximates the log of the Bayes factor for the model of interest compared to the 
saturated model; however, the BIC uses the sample size as the sole measure of the 
informativeness of the data and overlooks the data design or structure, which can be 
misleading since the hypothesis of interest may depend on only a subset of the overall 
data. 2) The posterior likelihood depends on the data and the researcher’s prior. If 
researchers have different priors, they will have different posteriors; thus different 
researchers analyzing the same data may reach different conclusions. The BIC 
assumes the unit prior, a prior equivalent to the amount of information in a single 
sample point; however, the amount of information represented in a unit prior will vary 
from application to application. He argues that the BIC is not the magical criterion for 11 
 
choosing between models, contrary to sociologists’ wishes (See Weakliem 1999; 2004  
for more details). Some researchers may continue to find the BIC useful as a rule of 
thumb for model simplification, but there is no obvious reason to prefer it to other 
informal criteria such as the ratio of L2 to degrees of freedom, Akaike’s information 
criterion, or the index of dissimilarity.  
The status exchange hypothesis as stated by Merton (1941) and Davis (1941) 
requires couples to be different on two dimensions, i.e., races and status—without 
these differences the “exchange” cannot happen. Since intermarried couples are 
already different in races, then for “exchange” to happen, there must be a status gap 
between minorities and their white partners; in particular, in terms of education, 
minority husband has to have more education than his white wife and minority wife 
has to have more education than her white husband. If minorities and their white 
partners have the same status, then there will be no “exchange” in terms of status in 
interracial marriage.  
In addition, to account for the educational differences between minorities and 
their white partners, we need to control for their educational distribution. Historically 
men tended to marry down along education (Schoen and Wooldredge 1989). Since 
white men tended to marry white women down along education, and since men tended 
to have more education than women, it is of no surprise that this pattern emerged in 
the black husband and white wife marriage combination. This could partly explain 
why Merton (1941) thought that this exchange pattern is stronger for black husband-
white wife pairs than other interracial pairs. But this hypergamy pattern for women 
who marry up in education was partly due to the differential gender distribution of 
education and has become less prevalent as women’s education increased.  
Couples also tend to marry homogenously because persons with equivalent 
resource are the ones most likely to maximize their rewards (Campbell 1971; Schoen 12 
 
1986). According to Mare (1991), people have a strong tendency to marry others of a 
similar educational background and this tendency has been increasing over the last 
half century. Status homogamy tends to emerge as the most important pattern of mate 
selection in general and it is of no surprise that homogamy is also strong in interracial 
marriages. Kalmijn (1998) and Rosenfeld (2005) have identified the theoretical bases 
for educational homogamy as individual utility maximization, affinity, and 
propinquity and exposure (See Kalmijn 1998, Rosenfeld 2005 for more details).  
Recognizing that the educational homogamy is strong in mate assorting in 
general and that there will be no “exchange” when intermarried couples have the same 
educational level, the best way to test status exchange is to examine whether the 
pattern of non-homogamous educational partnering within interracial marriage is 
asymmetric; and if it is, whether this educational association pattern is different from 
that of intraracial marriage. Quasi-symmetry (QS) and its variants are the natural base 
models for the “no status exchange” hypothesis
4. Firstly, the educational homogamy 
has already been accounted for under quasi-symmetry, in which the main diagonal 
cells that stand for educational homogamy are fitted exactly (perfectly). Secondly, the 
QS model accounts for the marginal distribution of husband’s and wife’s education. 
The symmetry model also fits the main diagonal cells perfectly, but it does not control 
for the different educational distributions of husband and wife.  
Based on the above argument, I proceed to reanalyze Fu’s (2001) data, which 
he claimed to corroborate status exchange by fitting the QS models to the cross-
classification table. After conducting a descriptive analysis, I first examine whether 
the QS pattern truly holds in the black husband & white wife and white husband & 
black wife pairs. Then I extend the QS model to other interracial as well as intraracial 
                                                 
4 In order to test for status exchange, Kalmijn (1993) compared observed hypergamy ratios with the 
expected hypergamy ratios from loglinear model under quasi-symmetry. He has inexplicitly used QS 
model as a “no status exchange” for the comparison model.  13 
 
marriage combinations to see whether the same educational association pattern holds 
in those cases. To assess the goodness-of-fit, I employ the likelihood-ratio test (LRT) 
and dissimilarity index. 
14 
CHAPTER 4 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
I reanalyze Fu’s (2001) data table which was derived from the 1990 US 
census, 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (U.S. Department of Commerce 1993). In it, 
Fu has linked couples by the state, household serial number, and subfamily number. 
Only native-born Americans are included to exclude the possible effects of nativity on 
intermarriage. The “straight line” (linear) assimilation theory (Alba and Nee, 1997) 
predicts that the foreign-born are less exogamous than the native-born, and that the 
younger the age at which an immigrant arrives, the more predisposed to intermarriage 
he or she will be. Although it might not be true from the point of view of non-linear 
assimilation theory, it tells us that the theories are different for native born and 
foreign-born Americans (Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn and Flap 2001). 
Fu analyzes the same-race marriage and only whites’ marriages with other 
minorities
5 because relatively few interracial marriages between nonwhite groups are 
available. Couples under age 35 are selected to reduce marriage survival bias (Cf Fu, 
2001 for details). Educational attainments are classified into “less than high school 
diploma, high school diploma or equivalent, some college but less than bachelor’s 
degree, and bachelor’s degree or more” (Fu, 2001, p151). 
Advantages and disadvantages of Census data 
Census data has been accepted as the most popular data sources for large-scale 
studies of races and ethnicity in the U.S. for its large nationally representative sample 
that makes comparison between many race groups possible.  Its disadvantages for 
                                                 
5 Only non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic blacks, non-Hispanic Mexican Americans, and non-Hispanic 
Japanese Americans are included. 15 
 
measuring intermarriage are well known as well (Harris and Ono, 2005; Mare 1991). 
First, census data measures the prevalence rather than the incidence of intermarriage, 
where demographic variables are measured cross-sectionally. For example, an 
individual’s socioeconomic status is to be included as an explanatory variable for a 
person’s selection of marriage partner. It would be ideal to obtain a measure prior to or 
at the time of marriage rather than using the current socioeconomic status at the time 
of survey because it is likely that a person’s socioeconomic status changes after 
marriage. Recognizing this, researchers usually use only educational attainment as an 
indicator of a person’s socioeconomic status since it not only is both highly correlated 
with occupational status and incomes but also remains unchanged over time. Besides, 
the use of occupation and income would restrict the sample to only employed persons 
and this could reduce the sample size and possibly exclude more women from the 
sample. Education thus is accepted as a reliable predictor of long-term economic well-
being (Kalmijn 1993), as it serves as a salient proxy for past and future socioeconomic 
status of the married individuals under study. 
Second, the age at first marriage is not available in most census data (1980 
census is an exception) and the census does not ask about prior marriages for currently 
married couples. Intra-marriages and intermarriages have different assortative mating 
patterns for first marriage and remarriage (Agresti 2002), it would be ideal to study 
recent first marriage. Also the passage of time is associated with increasing tolerance 
for exogamy. To minimize the selection bias caused by remarriage, intermarriages 
researchers, in practice, limit marriages to those newly-wed young couples since they 
are more likely to have married relatively recently, and are less likely to have 
experienced a divorce and remarriage (Fu 2001; Qian 1997; Harris and Ono 2005). As 
Hwang and Saenz (1990) have noted, Census’s prevalence data does not generally 
specify time and place of marriage which “makes it extremely difficult to view 16 
 
variations in intermarriage over time or cross-sectional variations between different 
groups as indicators of differential assimilation or structural variability” (Hwang and 
Saenz, 1990, p. 564). The cross-sectional data does not allow us to locate whether the 
intermarried ethnic minorities originally lived in less segregated area or they tend to 
move out after marriage from ethnic concentrated area to suburban area where the 
majority of whites live. The longitudinal data that surmount these obstacles which 
would enable us to draw a causal inference are neither currently available nor likely to 
be available soon.  As a result, the deficiency of the data should be kept in mind when 
drawing conclusions from this study.  
 
Methods 
Log-linear Models 
First some notation. For the I I ×  square contingency table,  let  ij n denote the 
observed frequency in the ith row and jth column of the table (i=1,2,…,I ; j=1, 2, …, 
I). Let  ij π denote the probability of an observation in cell (i,j) under a theoretical 
model and  ij μ  the corresponding expected frequency. The ij n  are assumed to have 
arisen as the result of either multinomial sampling or independent Poisson sampling. 
Loglinear models are often summarized by local odds ratios which give the odds-ratio 
for every set of adjacent rows i and i+1 and adjacent column j and j+1. Each local 
odds ratio, ij θ , is defined as:  
  1, 1 , 1 1, () / ( ) ij ij i j i j i j θ μμ μ μ ++ + + =                           (1.1) 
Let HR, WR, HE and WE denote husband’s race, wife’s race, husband’s 
education, and wife’s education. In the context of educational association in interracial 
marriages,  ijkl μ  is the expected number of marriages between husbands in education 
category i and race k  and wives in education category  j  and race l. 17 
 
In the next section, I consider various loglinear models for the data of the form:
 
log
HE WE HR WR
ijkl i j k l
HEWE HRWR HEHR WEWR HEWR WEHR
ij kl ik jl il jk
HEHRWR WEHRWR
ikl jkl
HEWEHRWR
ijkl
μλ λλλλ
λλλλλλ
λλ
λ
=+ + + +
++++++
++
+
    (1.2) 
When the last term 
HEWEHRWR
ijkl λ  is omitted, it implies HE and WE are 
independent for any given racial combination of husband and wife.  
The quasi-symmetry model for square tables was first introduced by Caussinus 
(1966) as an extension of the symmetry model. In this seminar paper, Caussinus 
showed that the likelihood of a QS model can also be solved by using iterative 
methods. This paper is often referred to as the first to explain the links between quasi-
independence (QI), symmetry (S), quasi-symmetry (QS) and marginal homogeneity 
(MH). Because of its explicit use of log-linear models and maximum likelihood 
methods, Causinus’ paper had a major influence on the development of log-linear 
model methodology. 
 
Quasi-Symmetry Model for “No Status Exchange” Hypothesis 
Here in the context of educational association, the quasi-symmetry model 
means that after adjusting for marginal distributions, odds-ratios are symmetric. The 
main diagonal cells that stand for the educational homogamy are fitted perfectly under 
the QS model. In the educational classification, quasi-symmetry means that people 
marry up and marry down in schooling are equally likely, after adjusting for the 
differences in the prevalence of educational attainment. In this sense, quasi-symmetry 
is a natural “base” model for the “no status exchange” hypothesis. 
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Variations on Quasi-symmetry 
  Separate QS/Unrestricted QS 
Separate quasi-symmetry model for each racial combination. It can also be 
referred to as an unrestricted quasi-symmetry (UQS) model, where the “unrestricted” 
refers to the fact that the association parameters are allowed to depend on the HR/WR 
combination, that is, 
HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR
ijkl jikl λλ =  for all combinations of i and j.  
  Uniform QS 
Uniform quasi-symmetry model (UniQS) for a collection of racial 
combinations; that is, all the educational association parameters are the same in each 
racial combination, 
HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR
ijkl ijk l λλ ′′ =  for all ij pairs. For example, when the 
UniQS model is fitted to the mixed-race marriage, the educational association 
parameters has the property of 
12 21 13 31 14 41
HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR HEWEHRWR
ij ij ij ij ij ij λλλλλλ ===== and the local 
odds ratios follows the property of 12 21 13 31 14 41 ij ij ij ij ij ij θ θθθθθ = ====.  
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ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
In this section, I first present a graphical display of Fu’s (2001) cross-
classification table of husband’ and wife’s schooling by husband’s and wife’s race, 
which reveals that quasi-symmetry might be a suitable model for the data. Then, I fit 
various loglinear models
6 for marriage between black husband and white wife (BW
7), 
assess the goodness-of-fit of different models, and show the quasi-symmetry (QS) fit 
the BW subtable reasonably well. I also apply quasi-symmetry to marriage between 
white husband and black wife (WB) and find that the QS model fits the WB table 
extremely well. Scrutinizing the educational associational parameters for BW and WB 
tables, I find they are similar. I then fit the QS model to other racial combinations and 
find that the QS model fits the data well except for the WW table, for which I will 
discuss the statistical lack of fit and the practical lack of fit by using dissimilarity 
index.   Based on the similar educational association parameters of the QS model for 
each racial combination, I finally apply the QS model to the mixed-race and the same-
race marriage excluding WW table.  
Descriptive Analysis 
First of all, I present the cross-classification table of Fu’s (2001) in Table 1 and 
Figure 1. Table 1 is the cross-classification of races and educational attainment in 
percentage; within each racial combination sub-table, the cell represents ij nN , where 
ij n  is the observed cell count in Fu’s and  ij ij Nn =∑ ∑  is the total number of 
                                                 
6 See Appendix A for model details. 
7 First letter represents husband’s race and second letter wife’s race, with W for whites, B for blacks, M 
for Mexican Americans, and J for Japanese Americans. For example, WB represents the couples in 
which husband is white and wife is black. There are 10 possible racial combinations: WW, WB, WM, 
WJ, BW, MW, JW, BB, MM, and JJ (Intermarriages among minorities are excluded).  20 
 
observations for that sub-table. Figure 1
8 is a graphical display of Table 1, with the 
size or area of each square proportional to ij nN . Zero counts in cells (of Fu’s) are 
represented by small open circles. 
Using simple tabular analyses, the Bernard study (1966) concludes that the 
majority of interracial marriages were educationally homogamous. This result is also 
found in Fu’s data. In Figure 1, most of the observations lie on the main diagonal for 
all sub-tables. This clearly shows a strong educational homogamous pattern for both 
intra-racial and interracial marriages. From Table 1, the percentage table of this cross-
classification, 49.3% of couples in black-white marriage were on the main diagonal, 
indicating a strong tendency for spouses to match on their educational attainment. 
Similarly, the percentages of educational homogamy for other interracial marriages are 
large and all above 50% except for Mexican husband and white wife (49.6%, slightly 
lower than 50%). In the same race marriages, not surprisingly, the same pattern is 
observed: 52.9% for white-white marriages, 51.2% for black-black marriages, 52.8% 
for Mexican-Mexican marriages, and 60.5% for Japanese-Japanese marriages are 
educationally equal. For marriages involved with Japanese, a large portion of 
marriages are on the right lower corner of the tables and for marriages involved with 
the Mexicans, most are on the left upper corners, which indicate that on average, 
Japanese have higher educational level than Mexicans, and that the educational 
distribution for Japanese is skewed to the higher-end and that for Mexicans is skewed 
to the lower-end. When the intermarriages were not similar in educational levels, for 
example, in the black husband and white wife marriages, 26.6% of the marriages are 
with black husbands marrying down, whereas 24.2% of the couples have white wife 
marrying down.  
                                                 
8 Halpin and Chan (2003) have used the figure to describe the educational association pattern in Ireland 
and Britain. 21 
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For intermarriage of white and Japanese Americans, the percentages are larger 
for Japanese marrying down (29.6% for Japanese husband marrying down compared 
to 14.2% of them marrying up in JW marriage; and 23.4% for Japanese wife marrying 
down compared to 19.1% of them marrying down). It seems to imply that Japanese 
spouse is more likely to marry down than his/her white partner. Recognizing the right-
skewness of educational distribution for Japanese Americans, the existence of larger 
proportion of Japanese marrying whites with less educational levels is not surprising 
in intermarriage between Japanese Americans and whites. However, if we control for 
the marginal distribution of educational attainment for both whites and Japanese 
Americans, the difference between hypergamy and hypogamy in term of education 
will disappear (the QS model that controls for marginal distributions of educational 
attainment fits the JW and WJ tables well). Off the diagonal, the tendency for matches 
between husband education  i HE and wife education  j WE  is nearly equal to that for 
matches between ji HE and WE , but still shows some asymmetry.  For example, for the 
BW subtable,  12 n =1688 (5.9%),  21 n =1425 (5.0%),  23 n =3384 (11.9%),  32 n =2094 
(7.3%),  34 n =1430 (5.0%), and  43 n =1072 (3.8%). However, the marginal distributions 
of husband and wife’s education have not been controlled for yet. When the disparity 
between the marginal distributions of educational distribution of husband and wife has 
been accounted for, we would expect a symmetry pattern in this table.  
Figure 1 does not control for the marginal distributions of husband’s and 
wife’s schooling either. The squares of off-diagonal cells seem to be symmetric along 
the main diagonal although there may still exist some differences between the area of 
those cells along the diagonal. Based on the fact that we have not controlled for the 
marginal distributions of spouses’ educational attainment and that the association seen 
from Figure 1 seems to be symmetric, we expect a quasi-symmetry model that would 
fit the data well.  24 
 
Loglinear Models 
Selected Models for the BW Table 
Table 2 Goodness-of-Fit of Selected Models to Black Husband and White Wife Table 
 
Model df  L2  p 
Independence 9  593.285  0 
Uniform 8  57.431  0 
Symmetry 6  12.213  0.057 
Quasi-independence 5  158.726  0 
Ordinal Quasi-symmetry  5  10.198  0.070 
Quasi-symmetry 3  3.456  0.326 
 
Table 2 shows the fit of several loglinear models
9 for marriages between black 
husbands and white wives. The independence model assumes that there is no 
association between husband’s education and wife’s education. Clearly, the 
independence model fits the data poorly here. I contrast the model of quasi-symmetry 
with that of symmetry, which posits equal frequencies in corresponding cells above 
and below the main diagonal of each education classification, 
HEWE HEWE
ij ji μμ = . The 
symmetry model improves the fit significantly over that of the independence model, 
but still shows some lack of fit. The fit of the symmetry model, 
2 L =12.213 with df=6, 
shows that observed frequencies are asymmetric. It is then interesting to see whether 
this asymmetry can be accounted for by the quasi-symmetry model, where I allow for 
marginal distributions for husband’s and wife’s schooling to differ. From the excellent 
fit of quasi-symmetry (
2 L =3.456 with df=3, with asymptotic p-value 0.326 which well 
exceeds 0.05.), it shows that the data on BW marriages is consistent with the 
                                                 
9 Please see Appendix A for models detail. 25 
 
hypothesis of no status exchange. The ordinal quasi-symmetry model still shows lack 
of fit and uniform fits poorly for the BW subtable. So here the QS model fits the BW 
table pretty well and it suggests that there is no asymmetry of exchange between 
educational level of black husband and that of white wife.  
Table 3 reports the fitted log local odds ratios for BW table. Since the property 
ij ji θ θ = holds under quasi-symmetry, I only list estimated log local odds ratios in the 
upper triangle of the table.  
Table 3 Estimates,log ij θ

, of Symmetric Local Associations Under Quasi-Symmetry 
for Black Husband and White Wife Subtable 
 
j  i 
1 2 3 
1 1.012 0.174 0.522
2 1.176 0.660
3 1.734
 
Now take a close look at the fitted log local odds ratios values. First, the 
relatively larger figures on the main diagonals (compared to the off diagonal) indicate 
a strong educational homogamy pattern and it is very difficult for persons to marry 
across the boundaries between adjacent educational categories. Since 
, ,1 1 , 1 ,1 , 1 ,1 1 , ,1 ˆ ( / ) ( / ) () () i i i i i i ii ii i i ii ii i i θμ μ μμ μ μ μμ + + ++ ++ + + == ⋅ ⋅ , it actually describes the 
ratio of educational homogamous over the educational non-homogamous for the 
adjacent rows and columns of educational levels. For example, the fitted local odds 
ratio for high school diploma and some college is  22 22 33 23 32 ˆ () () θ μμ μμ =⋅ ⋅ 
=exp(1.176) =3.241, which states that the odds of a person marries someone with a 
high school education relative to someone with some college is 3.241 times higher if 26 
 
the person has a high school education than if they have some college. The bigger the 
ratio is, the more likely people marry within their own educational category and the 
more difficult for people to marry across the educational levels. Clearly, 
33 ˆ exp(1.734) 5.66 θ ==  is the biggest, indicating that the boundary between some 
college and college degree (and above) is the most difficult for people to cross in 
terms of one categorical distance.  33 22 ˆˆ θ θ >  indicates that the boundary between some 
college and college degree (and above) is more difficult for a person with some 
college to cross than the boundary between some college and high school diploma. 
This is consistent with the finding that groups at the top of the educational hierarchy 
are more closed than groups in the middle (Uunk et al 1996; Hendrickx 1994 cited in 
Kalmijn 1998). The biggest of  33 ˆ θ  indicates that the strongest boundary is that 
between college graduates and lesser educated persons. One explanation for this 
strongest boundary is that colleges function as local marriage markets that are 
physically separated from settings in which lesser-educated persons are involved. Also 
people marry later and spend more time in school. The time between leaving school 
and marriage has narrowed. More likely unmarried people, especially the college 
educated, meet their spouse in school.  
The positive parameters indicate that the further apart the couples’ educational 
attainments, the less likely the marriage. For example, the odds ratio of less than high 
school diploma and college (and above) is simply the exponential of the sum of the 
local odds ratios in Table 3 including the lower triangle, which 
is
3,3
1, 1
exp( ) exp(6.634) 760.51 ij
ij
θ
==
== ∑ . It indicates that the odds of a black male 
marries a white partner with  less than high school diploma relative to a white partner 
with college degree is  nearly 761 higher if the black male has a less than high school 
education than if he has college degree.  
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Extension to Other Racial Combinations 
I then fit the QS model to the white husband and black wife marriage (WB). 
The excellent fit of QS (
2 L =1.495 with df=3) for WB table also strongly suggests that 
there is no exchange in the marriage of white husband and black wife. The excellent 
fit of the QS model for both BW and WB tables indicates that BW and WB follow the 
same educational association pattern, which is quasi-symmetry in character. This 
clearly suggests that there is no status exchange among white and black intermarriage.  
Actually, I also fit the QS model to other racial combinations (the same-race 
marriage and the mixed-race marriage between whites and Mexican Americans as well 
as between whites and Japanese Americans) and find that the QS model fits the data 
pretty well except for WW table. For WW table, QS model has a residual deviance of 
141 with 3 degrees of freedom. It shows a statistically significant lack of fit. However, 
the lack of fit here might be due to the large sample size since it is difficult to find 
models that fit the data according to conventional probability levels. 
Table 4 presents the observed vs. the fitted counts under QS model for the 
white-white marriages.  
Table 4 Observed V.S. Fitted Frequencies for WW Marriage 
 
Observed   Fitted 
21,802 22,939  9,175 1,171 21,802 22,966 9,261  1,058
19,008 90,470 43,631 9,076 18,981 90,470 44,199  8,535
6,742 39,008 66,462 20,214 6,656 38,440 66,462 20,868
913 9464  28,780 56,897 1,026 10,005 28,126  56,897
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Under the quasi-symmetry, the main diagonals of the WW subtable are fitted 
perfectly, which can be easily seen in Table 4. Off the diagonals, the fitted values 
deviate slightly from the observed frequencies.  
Assess Lack-of-Fit in WW marriages: Statistical but not Practical 
To assess whether it is actually practically lack of fit, I will use dissimilarity 
index (Agresti 2003, p329-330). Dissimilarity index, also called index of dissimilarity 
or referred to as “Delta” ( ˆ Δ), evaluates the lack of fit by estimating the smallest 
fraction of the population under study that would need to move to different cells in 
order for the model to fit perfectly. The statistic is calculated from model residuals and 
can be taken as a direct interpretation of the magnitude of departures from the model 
with smaller values representing a better fit ( ˆ 01 <=Δ< = ). It has been widely used in 
social science as a supplement to the model selection criteria such as those based on 
the log likelihood. I calculate the Delta under quasi-symmetry model for white-white 
marriages, which is 0.0045 here. Agresti (2002, p329) argues that when delta<0.02 or 
0.03, the sample data follow the model pattern quite closely, even though the model is 
not perfect. Though the relatively large 
2 L value for white-white marriages indicated 
that the QS model does not truly hold, the small Delta value suggests that, in a 
practical sense, it fits decently.  The reasonably fit of the QS model to each racial 
combination implies no status exchange.  
Variations on Quasi-symmetry 
Simply adding the quasi-symmetry fitting for each racial combination, I get the 
unrestricted quasi-symmetry (UQS) model. By looking at the estimated log local odds 
ratios
10 for each racial combination under quasi-symmetry, I find values of these 
parameters are quite close for all these sub-tables.  Then I try to fit uniform quasi-
                                                 
10 Upon request, the author will provide the log local odds ratios for each sub-table.  29 
 
symmetry (UniQS) model to all the tables by the additional restriction that all the 
educational association parameters are the same in each racial combination,  which 
results a fit of 
2 L = 374.37 with 84 degrees of freedom. This suggests the UniQS 
model for all the subtables shows some lack of fit. Thinking that the statistical lack-of-
fit might be skewed barely by the large sample size of white-white marriages, I fit 
separate UniQS models for the mixed-race marriages and the same-race marriages 
excluding whites. The excellent fit (for the-same race marriages excluding whites, the 
fit is 
2 L =29.18 with df=21; for the mixed-race marriages, 
2 L =50.327 with df=48) 
strongly suggests that the same-race and mixed-race marriages share a broadly similar 
pattern of educational homogamy, which is quasi-symmetric in character. In addition, 
the closeness of the fitted log local odds ratios of UniQS models for different racial 
combinations (see Table 5) strongly indicates that there is a remarkable consistency 
and symmetry in husband/wife educational attainment regardless of race (with the 
possible exception of white/white marriages); intermarried couples share a similar 
level of education, and educational homogamy dominates the educational marriages, 
no matter how strong the racial endogamy is. 30 
 
Table 5 Estimates,log ij θ

, of Symmetric Local Associations Under Quasi-
Symmetry 
 
J 
Racial combinations  i 
1 2 3 
1 1.510 0.192 0.524 
2 1.264 0.486  White-White 
3 1.863 
1 1.504 -0.054 0.379 
2 1.452 0.350  Same-Race(no WW) 
3 1.722 
1 1.206 0.153 0.321 
2 1.247 0.540  Mixed-Race 
3 1.866 
Table 5 presents the log local odds ratios for the uniform quasi-symmetry 
models for different racial combinations.   
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DISCUSSION 
Based on the above analysis, we claim that the same-race and mixed-race 
marriage share a broadly similar pattern of educational homogamy, which is quasi-
symmetric in character; and that there is little, if any, evidence for the status exchange 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the evidence strongly indicates that there is a remarkable 
consistency and symmetry in husband/wife educational attainment regardless of race 
(white/white marriages may be slightly exceptional). 
Here I am not denying race as a salient social distinction that people make in 
their marriage choices since spouses disproportionately often belong to the same race, 
but that educational homogamy is strong enough for couples to cross the racial line 
and that intermarried couples share a similar level of education, and educational 
homogamy dominates the educational marriages, no matter how strong the racial 
endogamy is. In fact, most exchange theorists also do not deny the importance of 
status homogamy (Elder 1969; Goode 1951). 
 
Is Education a Valid Indicator? 
Educational attainment affects marital choice in terms of both opportunity and 
preference. Educational institutions provide settings for intergroup interaction, and 
educational attainment is believed to have an effect on values, attitudes, knowledge, 
and life-styles of an individual (Kalmijn and Flap 2001). The prominence of 
educational homogamy increases in terms of preference and opportunities over time. 
First, due to the rapid increases in educational attainment in all populations, people’s 
values, norms, and life-styles are more likely at later dates to be formed by common 32 
 
experiences in educational institutions (Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn 1991; Kalmijn and 
Flap 2001). Second, the opportunities for matching on education have increased due to 
the prolonged numbers of years spent in educational institutions (Mare 1991). 
Conclusions and Possible Future Research 
In this paper, I have reexamined Fu’s data which supposedly support status 
exchange according to his preferred models. Using the simple QS model and its 
variations, I show that they actually support no status exchange. 
In addition, I have disputed Rosenfeld’s claim that simple tabular analysis has 
been marginalized because of their simplicity by identifying a complex model, the QS 
model, which indeed supports no status exchange hypothesis rather than status 
exchange. The apparent contradiction is not real and the contradictory results are 
really due to the insistence on interpreting models that are not consistent with the data. 
Loglinear models (the QS models and its variations) that are consistent with the data 
clearly suggest status exchange is a myth.  
Furthermore, I have proposed a new model that better explains the educational 
pattern in intermarriage. The QS model and its variations bear the natural base for “no 
status exchange” hypothesis and they are consistent with the data.  
The present research suggests several possible future studies. One study could 
investigate whether the status exchange hypothesis holds true in early 1940s when the 
racial boundary is exceptionally strong and also investigate whether it holds true in 
2000 census data. Perhaps in the era of Merton (1941) and Davis (1941), minority 
people did compensate their social status for the racial status in interracial marriage. If 
the status exchange hypothesis did hold true when the group boundary was strong and 
it is not the case for the more recent data set, it might indicate the weakening of group 
boundaries in race lines. If the status exchange hypothesis receives no empirical 
support from the early data set, the justification of its continued use will be 33 
 
questioned. It might also be interesting to explore how the educational association 
pattern changes over time and how the educational combination in local marriage 
market influences people’s marital choice.  
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APPENDIX A 
An  I I ×  table satisfies symmetry when , ij ji ij π π = ≠ . This gives a loglinear 
model 
 
                                  , log ij i j ij μ λλλ λ = +++  (A.1) 
where ij ji λ λ =  for all i and j. In this model, the main-effect terms are the same for the 
two expected frequencies ij ji μ μ = , and marginal homogeneity occurs. As commonly 
believed, the symmetry model rarely fits well, especially when the marginal 
distributions differ substantially. 
The quasi-symmetry model is less restrictive than the symmetry model. It 
allows the main-effect terms in the symmetry model to differ. I define quasi-symmetry 
m o d e l  b y                  log ,
RC
ij i j ij μ λλ λ λ =+ + +                   ( A . 2 )  
where  ij ji λ λ =  for all i<j with the residual df =(I-1)(I-2)/2(Caussinus 1966). 
Agresti (2002, p. 425) also defines the following properties or conditions for 
the quasi-symmetry model to hold 
ij II ji II
iI Ib jI Ia
for all i j
μ μμ μ
μμ μμ
= <                        (A.3) 
o r        , ij ji θ θ =                   ( A . 4 )  
that is, the odds ratios on one side of the main diagonal are identical to corresponding 
odds ratios on the other side 
When 1,...,
RC
ii for i I λλ == , it becomes the usual model of symmetry, and 
when all  ij λ =0, it’s the independence model. Under such conditions, Caussinus’s 
(1966) showed that the symmetry model is equivalent to the quasi-symmetry model 
and marginal homogeneity holds simultaneously, thus 35 
 
 
symmetry quasi-symmetry+marginal homogeneity. ≡                                 (A.5) 
 
Special cases of quasi-symmetry: 
Quasi-independence 
Quasi-independence is the special case of quasi-symmetry when { } ij for i j λ ≠  
are identical, and when I=3, they are equivalent (Caussinus, 1966). It has a perfect fit 
on the main diagonal, but independence holds for the off-diagonals. Usually this 
model would be used for tables that should be independent on the off-diagonal cells, 
but have large counts on the main diagonal. 
log ( )
RC
ij i j iI ij μλ λλδ =+ + + = ,                                                             (A.6) 
where 
1,
()
0, .
ij
Ii j
ij
= ⎧
== ⎨ ≠ ⎩
  
Ordinal Quasi-symmetry Model 
When categories are ordered, I can fit a more parsimonious model. Let 
1 ... I uu ≤≤ denote ordered scores for both the rows and columns. An ordinal quasi-
symmetry model is                log , ij i j j ij u μ λλλ β λ = +++ +                 ( A . 7 )  
where ij ji for all i j λ λ =< . It is the special case of the quasi-symmetry model in 
which 
CR
jj j u λ λ β −=  has a linear trend. When β =0, it becomes the symmetry model. 
Quasi-uniform Association (Goodman 1979) 
  log ( )
RC
ij i j i j i uu I i j μλ λλβ δ =+ + + + =                                     (A.8) 
permits linear-by-linear association off the main diagonal. When scores are equally 
intervaled, it has uniform local association, given that the responses differ.  
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Figure 2 Educational Patterns in Black-White Intermarriage 
 
Rosenfeld (2005) has visualized the black-white intermarriage pattern; 
however, he did not include in his figure the strength of intermarriage in term of 
educational level. So here Figure App. B shows educational patterns in black-white 
marriages, which has also taken advantage of Gullickson’s (2004) visualizations. The 
thick solid lines inside the box represent the median educational level. The dark 
arrows between the two groups represent educational homogamy with upper arrows 
thicker than the lower ones, which indicates the greater propensity for blacks and 
whites at higher educational levels to form interracial marriages; while downward 
sloping dashed arrow indicates status exchange. 
As Rosenfeld (2005) has argued, in the climate of inequality between whites 
and blacks, homogamy can be mistaken for exchange because of the incomplete 
Black 
Status Exchange     
Homogamy  
White
Racial Status Position 
High 
Low
Socioeconomic 
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information about the interracial couples due to the taboo of intermarriage and social 
distances between blacks and whites (see also Rosenfeld 2005). For example, in 
Figure 2, the second solid line between the black and white groups represents an 
educationally homogamous marriage. So in this intermarriage, both spouses have the 
same socioeconomic level. However, from the view of “lower status” blacks, people 
with relative higher SES marry out (it’s above the median educational level); while 
from whites’ perspective, people with relative lower SES (below the median of white 
educational level) marry out.  
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